

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200150031-8

CIA CABLE BRANCH

CONFIDENTIAL

58
Action

Classification

Control: 14278

E

Rec'd: January 26, 1961
11:56 a.m.

JAN 27 8 11 AM '61

Info

FROM: Ankara

L

TO: Secretary of State

EUR

NO: 913, January 26, 9 a.m.

NEA

UCEA

SCA

SENT DEPARTMENT 913, BEIRUT 57, PARIS 113; REPEATED INFORMATION
ISTANBUL, IZMIR, ISKENDERUN UNNUMBERED.

MC

MOP

OCB

INR

CIA

PARIS PASS USRO.
Reference Embassy telegram 869.

NSA

OSD

ARMY

AIR

NAVY

NIC

CAB

COM

FAA

TRSY

RMR

Further talks between Embassy officers and Foreign Office representatives on subject Soviet scheduled commercial aviation overflights have included Charge's discussion with Foreign Minister. Also contacts with Turkish military by JUSMFAT and CAS separately reported.

Strong representations made to effect Turkish (and American) security interests involved. Appropriate suggestions also made for delay or extending negotiations including reciprocal rights demand, inapplicability Montreux convention, requests for further details re schedules, destination, et cetera Foreign Office representatives advise (confirmed by other sources) Soviet Ambassador has seen Ministers Defense, Interior, Commerce, Communications, and Industry. No ministry has raised serious objections. Result is tentative favorable cabinet decision.

Foreign Office representatives countered arguments: (A) With fact Czech flight (Embassy G-46 July 27, 1960) have already set precedent and already compromise security if in fact this involved; (B) despite possible inapplicability Montreux convention, concern expressed Soviets may attempt press for reopening whole subject of convention if overflight rights denied and GOTT must

/view

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

REQUESTED BY

Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200150031-8

Jag Harvey - RI

CT

AIR
SRA
ECON
SSG

- ORR

- IR

- DDP/CM

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 913, January 26, 9 a.m., from Ankara

view Montreux convention as pertinent; (C) while might request reciprocal rights even if refused GOT still bound grant Soviet request in view (B) above (Note: Sunay told CAS reciprocal rights not pertinent since convinced Soviet would grant immediately); (D) still have not finalized details other than expected landing rights, refueling and maintenance Ankara with overflight Inebolu and Silifke, with destination Beirut, since this unnecessary to grant request. Further difficult refuse in light Czech rights even though admitting those rights granted under pre-existing bilateral agreement.

View above seems evident GOT not really desirous finding means refuse or delay.

With foregoing background in mind Charge raised question with Foreign Minister Sarper January 21 continued discussion January 23. Sarper seemed recognize security risks involved said no final decision yet reached and would not be until he approves or is overruled. Said has referred matter to legal experts for study with suggestion they drag their feet. Response direct question Sarper said no quid pro quo involved USSR request. Further under principles Montreux convention not justified requesting reciprocal rights. Under circumstances noted above Charge did not attempt refute point. Charge concluded without contradiction GOT consideration apparently based only legalistic interpretations. Remarked seemed peculiar that USSR request was for overflights to Beirut although reportedly no approach yet made Lebanese. Sarper said USSR request may be feeler to test GOT reactions. Charge said whole question overflights being discussed NATO with considerable concern (POLTO 953 from USRO Paris). Sarper repeated precedent-setting Czech authorization and also said understood Hungarian request approved. Sarper concluded by again noting own disposition to stall.

Comment: Evident from talks that GOT generally does not view
/commercial

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 913, January 26, 9 a.m., from Ankara

commercial flight request as serious and for unknown reasons favorably disposed. Believe Sarper will try to stall but believe ultimate result will be grant USSR request. While no evidence, in light previous expressed interest THY in securing further assistance particularly for international operations, mission inclined speculate there may be Soviet aircraft offer in background as bait. Unable verify this conjecture. GOT position also may be influenced by fairly constant rebuffs Soviet re aid, trade, et cetera, and desire achieve more balance in Turkish-Soviet relations.

COWLES

MLJ/10

CONFIDENTIAL